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Abstract 
 
The age-old concept of partnership was seen by Muslim jurists from the 8th 
century Hijra onwards as a sacrosanct commercial arrangement – and, 
therefore, subjected to a form of fixity which is unparalleled in any other 
religious tradition. Since the formative period of Islamic law, the limited-liability 
partnership, or muḍāraba, a specific variation of the over-arching mushāraka 
partnership, has continued to hold central importance for Muslims. Yet, despite 
this centrality, it has not been examined with a view to reformulating it for 
contemporary Islamic banking and finance. This has led to its virtual neglect in 
modern Islamic banking operations. This article suggests that the revival of the 
muḍāraba facility requires the overcoming of key disadvantages inherent in its 
structure and that a restructuring on the basis of the hybrid facility called 
participating preferred ijāra is one possible way of achieving such an outcome. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Since their appearance in the 1970s, Islamic financial institutions (IFI) have 
been fixated, at least theoretically, on financial transactions which are designed 
to conform to the profit-loss sharing mode (PLS). The reason for this is two-fold: 
firstly, they are determined to adhere to the view of Muslim orthodoxy, which 
holds that interest is akin to the prohibited ribā and therefore is absolutely 
prohibited;1 secondly, they seek to differentiate themselves from their 
conventional counterparts as “Islamic”.2 Furthermore, Farooq describes IFIs as 
having idealised the PLS mode because of their determination to avoid debt-
financing and use partnership and equity-financing, similar to venture 
                                                 
1  Hamid Harasani, “Analysing the Islamic Prohibition on Ribā: A Prohibition on Substance or 
Form?”, Arab Law Quarterly 27 (2013): 289–296; Muhammad M. Iqbal, “Prohibition of 
Interest and Economic Rationality”, Arab Law Quarterly 24 (2010): 293–308. 
2  Mohammad O. Farooq, “Partnership, Equity-Financing and Islamic Finance: Whither Profit–
Loss Sharing?”, Review of Islamic Economics 11 (2007): 68. 
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capitalism.3 This idealisation has its roots in classical Muslim jurisprudence, 
which gave centrality to two principal modes of PLS contract practiced by pre-
Islamic Arabs and the early Muslims: shirka/mushāraka (partnership) and 
muḍāraba (limited liability partnership). According to Taqi Usmani, the globally 
renowned Ḥanafī scholar and pioneer of Islamic Banking in Pakistan, these are 
the “real and ideal instruments of financing in Sharīʿah”.4 Paradoxically, while 
the pertinent literature in the Islamic Banking and Finance (IBF) movement 
continues to emphasise PLS as the main financial mode (and simultaneously 
continues to idealise mushāraka and muḍāraba), in practice IFIs have 
deliberately and systematically avoided them, as Farooq has shown.5 This is 
unsurprising since the parameters for the PLS modes in classical Islamic law are 
not well-thought out and therefore have little appeal to investors/lenders. This 
article will highlight the aforementioned parameters with specific regard to the 
muḍāraba facility and suggest ways of restructuring it based on Islamic legal 
theory. It is hoped that the outcome will imply that the modified forms of PLS 
financing can once again take their place as central in IBF. 
Consistent with the study of Usmani,6 this article is divided into two 
parts: the first part undertakes a historical evaluation of mushāraka, which is a 
useful preamble to understanding muḍāraba, a subsidiary financial 
arrangement. Thereafter, we commence with a study of muḍāraba as a central 
financial instrument in the history of Islamic commercial law. Here we discuss 
the historical precedent of this financial instrument along with how the gradual 
onset of rigidity in Islamic legal reasoning might have been a central factor in 
jeopardising the underlying real economy in the Muslim world. The final section 
elaborates on one of the ways to revive the economy of the Muslim world – the 
adaptation of the muḍāraba facility to a hybrid form.  
 
 
2  Mushāraka 
 
Mushāraka (sharika, partnership) was a pre-Islamic organisational form of 
contract which by the 3rd century Hijra (9th century CE) became islamicised 
through its integration into the fiqh literature. In essence, it allowed the pooling 
of resources of economic agents in the form of cash, goods, skills, or a 
combination of the same,7 and was akin to a private equity firm in the context of 
conventional finance. The term sharika is generally employed in Islamic 
jurisprudential literature more so than the term mushāraka, the latter being a 
neologism recently introduced in the area of Islamic finance.8 Since mushāraka 
constitutes an equity contract, its payoffs are based on profit and loss sharing. 
This is in contrast to rigid debt contracts, i.e., ribawī contracts, which are 
prohibited in Islam. 
                                                 
3  Ibid.  
4  Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2002). 
5  Supra note 2. 
6  See Muhammad Taqi Usmani, “The Concept of Musharakah and Its Application as an Islamic 
Method of Financing”, Arab Law Quarterly 14 (1999): 203–220. 
7  Abraham L. Udovitch, “Partnership in Medieval Islamic Law’‘, PhD Dissertation, (Yale 
University, 1965). 
8  Supra note 6 at 205. 
3 
 
In the era of the Prophet (PBUH), and for several generations after his death 
(considered the golden-age of Islam, including the period of the Rightly-Guided 
Caliphs and the Successors), Arab society was commercially savvy, apparently 
employing several forms of mushāraka structures, as described in the fiqh 
literature: 
 
(1) Partnership in ownership (shirkat al-milk), a basic form of partnership 
ensuing when two or more individuals jointly own a particular asset 
without a commercial aim. This joint ownership may take place at their 
discretion. For example, if two persons jointly buy a car, their 
relationship is termed as shirkat al-milk. In other cases, the joint 
ownership may compulsorily ensue without any action taken by either 
parties, for example, if two persons inherit a property jointly, they take 
ownership automatically. 
 
(2) Partnership by contract (shirkat al-ʿaqd) is a form of partnership 
undertaken by two or more persons for commercial purposes. This form 
of partnership can be further categorised into: 
 
(i) Shirkat al-amwāl, where two or more persons contribute capital in 
a commercial enterprise; 
(ii) Labour partnership (shirkat al-ʿabdān), where two or more 
persons undertake to deliver some services to their customers and 
share the income generated;  
(iii) Credit partnership (shirkat al-wujūh), where the partners provide 
neither capital nor labour to invest; they buy goods or services on 
credit for the purpose of selling them and distributing the profit in 
accordance with the ratio of individual liabilities;9 and 
(iv) Silent partnership (muḍāraba), where one party (the silent 
partner) provides funding while the other party (entrepreneur) 
provides labour. Profits are distributed in accordance with an 
agreed-upon ratio, where: (1) all monetary losses are borne by the 
silent partner; while (2) the entrepreneur loses his labour and 
time. 
 
It is unusual that the mushāraka facility should have acquired a quasi-divine 
status given that simple partnership forms were not an Islamic innovation, but 
rather existed in Arabia in the pre-Islamic era.10 In fact, we know from historical 
sources that partnerships were known and practiced in the Near East at least 
since the Babylonians, and they were discussed in the Talmud and in the Corpus 
Juris Civilis of Justinian.11 Yet Muslims are generally nostalgic about the 
mushāraka facility. Clearly it played an important role in the economy in early 
Islamic history, but this cannot account for the post-formative and 
contemporary fetish. The most plausible explanation is the attitude toward 
mushāraka expressed by Muslim jurists. For example, the 13th century Ḥanafī 
                                                 
9  Mahmoud El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
10  Supra note 7 at 7–8. 
11  Ibid. 
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jurist, al-Maḥmūd b. Mawdūd al-Mūṣilī (d. 1284), who cites in his commentary 
the following Prophetic traditions: 
 
The hand of God is above two partners so long as none of them betrays 
his partner; if one of them betrays his partner, [God] withdraws His hand; 
God is the third in a partnership of two as long as they do not betray one 
another; if they betray one another, the grace is erased.12  
 
He also presents the Prophet’s involvement in a partnership with Qays b. Sā’ib as 
a normative act, following which he proclaims,  
 
The Prophet was sent at a time when people engaged in partnerships; he 
did not censure them from engaging in this arrangement and so it has 
been employed until our day. That there exists no censurer indicates the 
community’s consensus.13  
 
It is unclear whether the consensus al-Mūṣilī invokes relates to mere permission 
to engage in a partnership based on customary practice or whether it relates to 
some sort of divine sanction. It seems that Muslims understood it to be the 
latter, since there is an extensive literature ensuing from both classical and 
contemporary jurists on the merits of mushāraka contracts.  
A question discussed in the modern Western literature is whether the 
exposition of mushāraka in the fiqh literature is sufficient proof that the 
instrument was practically employed by Muslims. For some decades the 
dominant view among Western scholars of Islamic Law has been that the fiqh 
had very little to do with actual practice. Fiqh was considered by these scholars 
to be only of theoretical significance, and was developed by the jurists according 
to a paradigm which they considered represented the golden age of Islam. 
According to these scholars, to assume that the fiqh literature reflected the 
institutions and practice in classical Muslim societies is perilous. Yet we have 
started to see a more nuanced approach to this subject, with Udovitch among 
those advancing a different hypothesis on the question of theory and practice. 
Udovitch has highlighted that:  
 
While recognising the ideal character of Islamic law, one cannot state a 
priori that any given institution had no relationship whatsoever to 
practice. This is especially so in the area of fiqh termed muʿāmalāt. Most 
of the material covered by these laws, for example, the contracts of 
partnership and commenda, does not involve any religious or moral 
principle. No religious or ethical value is attached to them. In the earliest 
legal texts especially, there is no reason not to consider them as a 
reflection and partial description of the institutions as they existed at that 
time.14  
 
Furthermore, according to Udovitch:  
                                                 
12  Al-Maḥmūd b. Mawdūd al-Mūṣilī, Al-Ikhtiyār li-taʿlīl al-mukhtār (Beirut: Dār al-Arqam bin 
Abī al-Arqam, reprinted in 1999).  
13  Ibid., p. 19. 
14  Supra note 7. 
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The chapters on partnership and commenda contain numerous instances 
in which systematic legal reasoning is suspended because of the ‘custom 
of the merchants’ or ‘because of the needs of the merchants.’ Other 
applications of juristic preference (istiḥsān), although not coupled with 
these phrases, reveal a clear tendency toward allowing a greater freedom 
of trade practice. In the later legal treatises, this leniency, which often 
provides valuable indications of actual practice, is replaced by imitation 
and rigidity.15  
 
It has been highlighted above that mushāraka became enshrined within the 
Islamic legal literature as a result of a broader process of islamicisation which 
integrated within the Islamic legal system many cultural and customary 
practices that were prevalent at the birth of Islam. Furthermore, the fact that 
classical Muslim jurists were, in some ways, jacks of all trades, they perpetuated 
the idea that mushāraka was divinely ordained in their legal compendia. Kuran 
says: 
 
For at least a half-millenium after the birth of Islam, then, Islamic 
partnership law was adopted by peoples located in far corners of the 
world as the institutional basis for commercial cooperation […] Islamic 
partnership law presented limitations even by medieval standards. Most 
of its variants required a partnership’s principal to consist of currency; 
they prohibited investing merchandise directly, ostensibly to prevent 
unjust enrichment, more plausibly to forestall conflicts over the value of 
the initial investment and the division of profits. Moreover, the 
merchant’s mission was incomplete until he reconverted all merchandise 
bought on behalf of the partnership into the selected currency. When 
these rules were followed, they could drive partners to sell merchandise, 
or trade currencies, at an inopportune time or place.16  
 
 Kuran is bemused as to why modern Islamists want to restructure economies 
according to such rules:  
 
In truth, by modern standards Islamic partnerships are very simple 
organizations. They are meant to support ventures of finite duration, not 
to open-ended ventures without an expected settlement date. They are 
poorly suited to projects requiring a huge sunk investment and delivering 
returns over many years. Because they lack legal personhood, before the 
law their members deal with third parties as individuals, rather than 
employees of a firm.17  
 
Despite the extensive efforts of the scholars, the onset of modernity has 
handicapped them. This is because the venturing of traditionally trained jurists 
into spheres of human life which demand technical knowledge has implications 
                                                 
15  Ibid., p. 13. 
16  Timur Kuran, The Long Divergence. How Islamic Law Held Back The Middle East 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 60. 
17  Ibid. 
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on the development of Muslim societies. The economic decay of the Muslim 
world is described by Schacht as follows: 
 
Islamic law, which until the early ʿAbbāsid period had been adaptable and 
growing, from then onwards became increasingly rigid and set in its final 
mould ... . It was not all together immutable, but the changes which did 
take place were concerned more with legal theory and the systemic 
superstructure than with positive law ... . Taken as a whole, however, 
Islamic law reflects and fits the social and economic conditions of the 
early ʿAbbāsid period, but has become more and more out of touch with 
later developments of state and society.18 
 
To elaborate the above further, we state that the mushāraka form has failed to 
evolve from the rudimentary stage of its inception in the medieval era to a form 
such as the corporate one which endows it the following comparative 
advantages: (i) limited liability; (ii) unlimited life; (iii) ease of transferability 
(liquidity) of shares (ensuing from a secondary market); and centralized 
management.19 Undoubtedly, this has had a corollary effect in the subsidiary 
form, known as muḍāraba. 
 Following this overview of mushāraka, the over-arching partnership form 
in Islamic jurisprudence, our discussion can now move to muḍāraba. 
 
  
3  Muḍāraba 
 
Muḍāraba is a limited liability contract between a principal (ṣāḥib al-māl or 
rabb al-māl) and an agent (muḍārib), which constitutes a partnership of capital 
and entrepreneurship. The principal advances funds to an agent to be employed 
in a particular project, in return for a share in the profit (in a mutually pre-
agreed ratio). The losses, if incurred, are borne only by the principal. This 
financial arrangement is a specific form of partnership (shirka or mushāraka), 
where capital owners (unable to participate in a trade) team up with those who 
have the necessary business skills (but are deficient in capital). This financial 
arrangement was known and practised in the Near East as early as the 
Babylonians,20 known and discussed in the Talmud and later Rabbinical 
literature,21 and its various forms were practiced by Meccan merchants 
preceding Islam,22 which explains its employment in early Islam. 
                                                 
18  Joseph Schacht, “Pre-Islamic Background and Early Development of Jurisprudence: The 
Schools of Law and Later Developments of Jurisprudence", in Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. 
Liebesny (Eds.), Law in the Middle East, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 
1955), 76–77. 
19  See Andrew Winton, “Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm", 
Journal of Finance 48 (1993): 487–512; Timur Kuran, “The Logic of Financial 
Westernization in the Middle East", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 56 
(2005): 593–615. 
20  Supra note 7. 
21  See Bernard Jackson, Jewish Law in Legal History and the Modern World (Leiden: Brill, 
1980). 
22  Supra note 7. 
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Muḍāraba is a derivative of the Arabic infinitive, ḍarb (travel), as in the 
expression ḍarb fī l-arḍ, “to travel the land”. It is called muḍāraba because the 
agent earns his percentage of a venture’s profits as a consequence of the effort 
and labour he expends.23 The term muḍāraba is of Iraqi origin, and was the 
preferred term of Ḥanafī jurists to describe this particular form of arrangement 
because of its close semantic connection with the Qur’ānic verse, “... And others 
travelling (yaḍribūna) through the land (for the purposes of trade)”.24,25 Jurists 
of the Mālikī and Shāfiʿī Schools of Law refer to this contract as muqāraḍa (lit. 
“to surrender the profits”).  
According to the 11th century Ḥanafī jurist, al-Sarakhsī, the legality of this 
form of contract is known via the normative practice of the Prophet (sunna) and 
the consensus of the early Muslims (ijmāʿ). He cites several traditions in support 
of muḍāraba, the first two of which are given here: The practice of ʿAbbās ibn 
ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib when he engaged in a muḍāraba arrangement was to stipulate 
in the contract that the agent (muḍārib) should not travel overseas or descend 
on a valley. If the agent failed to comply with this stipulation, ʿAbbās would 
demand compensation in the event of a loss. The news of this reached the 
Prophet, who deemed it acceptable. Another tradition tells of the two sons of 
ʿUmar, ʿAbd Allāh and ʿUbayd Allāh, who once came to stay with Abū Mūsā in 
Iraq. After lamenting the fact that he did not have any savings from which he 
could support the two men, he offered them instead some money from the 
treasury (bayt al-māl). He advised them to trade with the money and then, on 
their return to Medina, return the capital to the Leader of the Faithful (amīr al-
muʾminīn) and retain the profits for themselves. When ʿUmar heard of the 
arrangement, he protested that the capital was from the public treasury and so 
any profits generated from it should be returned to the public fund. It was only 
after some companions advised ʿUmar to consider his two sons as agents 
(muḍārib), whereby they were to take half of the profits and the other half is 
returned to the treasury, that ʿUmar was willing to acquiesce.26 The remaining 
evidences which al-Sarakhsī furnishes in support of muḍaraba are of a similar 
ilk to these aforementioned traditions. Interestingly, in common with other 
jurists of the classical period, al-Sarakhsī made no attempt to provide a rational 
justification for this form of contract.  
Muḍāraba was probably employed because it (i) circumvented the 
problem of ribā and (ii) allowed the investor to overcome the problem of having 
to precisely fix a wage in an arrangement which was essentially the provision of 
capital in exchange for labour. These advantages would have been factors which 
led the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) himself and his eminent companions to 
employ this facility in trade, either as a muḍārib or as a rabb al-māl.27 Yet there 
remained the inherent inefficiency associated with this arrangement, since the 
rabb al-māl was required to provide 100% of the capital, whilst at the same time 
                                                 
23  Shams al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad al-Sarakhsī (d. 945), Kitāb al-Mabsūṭ (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 
2000), 17. 
24  See Q73:20. 
25  Supra note 23. 
26  Ibid. 
27  See Monzer Kahf and Tariqullah Khan, “Principles of Islamic Financing: A Survey", Research 
Paper No. 16, Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia (1992); M. Nejatullah Siddiqi, Partnership and Profit Sharing in Islamic Law 
(Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1985). 
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being the sole bearer of losses. This naturally created an incentive (agency) 
issue, as the muḍārib had none of his capital at stake.28 Another form of 
inefficiency was the denial of any form of control rights to the rabb al-māl. Both 
of these problems explain why the rabb al-māl tended to stipulate certain 
restrictions on the muḍārib, as can be seen in the above case of cAbbās, uncle of 
the Prophet, and in the long-term almost certainly led to the decline in the 
employment of muḍāraba as an instrument of financial intermediation. 
Despite its disadvantages, the Muslim schools of law generally endorsed the 
application of muḍāraba in commerce, with Ḥanafī jurists taking a more liberal 
stance in contrast to the more conservative Shāfiʿī, Mālikī and Ḥanbalī jurists, 
who advocated its employment only in trade, where hired labour was not 
feasible.29 For the latter schools, as explained by Hasanuz-Zaman,30 muḍāraba 
defied both the general law of hire as well as ran afoul of several Ḥadīths – 
‘Profit goes with liability’ (al-kharāj bi-ḍ-ḍamān) and ‘… (no) profits without 
liability’ (… lā ribḥ mā lā yuḍman) both of which form the basis of the well-
known legal maxim ‘profits are concomitant to risk’ (al-ghunum bi-l-ghurum) – 
since the working partner is entitled to profits without having to bear any risk. 
As for its defiance of the general laws of hire, Hasanuz-Zaman elaborates: 
 
Muḍārabah is a relationship between capital and labour in which the 
former utilizes the services and skill of the latter in return for a share in 
expected profits. Thus, it is essentially a contract of hire/ wage. But 
according to the basic rules of the Sharīʿah based on the Prophet's saying, 
a contract of hire/wage should precisely lay down the amount of 
hire/wage to be paid to the worker, failing which the contract becomes 
voidable and therefore the worker will have to be paid standard wage (ajr 
al-miṯl). In a contract of muḍārabah, on the other hand, the condition of 
precise fixation of wage to the worker does not exist. Thus the analogy of 
the law of wage demands that muḍārabah should be held unlawful. But the 
holy Prophet, in supersession of this rule, exempted this contract from the 
purview of the law of hire.31 
 
The rather more liberal approach of the Ḥanafīs is the view promoted by the 
Jamāt-e-Islāmī, a political Islamist group of the Indo-Pak subcontinent.32 Its 
employment in the Islamic financial intermediation as a double muḍāraba is 
advanced by Uzair.33 In the first tier, the Islamic bank acts as a muḍārib, while 
the depositors serve as the rabb al-māl. In the second tier, the bank serves as a 
rabb-al-māl, thereby trusting an entrepreneur to conduct his/her business 
venture. Profits, if any, are shared between them, and then between the bank 
                                                 
28  On this, see Humayon A. Dar and John R. Presley “Lack of Profit-Loss Sharing in Islamic 
Banking: Management and Control Imbalances", International Journal of Islamic Financial 
Services 2 (2000): 3–18. 
29  See Syed M. Hasanuz-Zaman, “Muḍārabah in non-trade operations’‘, Journal of King Abdul 
Aziz University: Islamic Economics 2 (1990): 69–88. 
30  Ibid., p. 81. 
31  Ibid. p. 70. 
32  See Siddiqi, Partnership and Profit Sharing; M. Umar Chapra, “Why has Islam prohibited 
interest? Rationale behind the prohibition of interest", in A.S. Thomas (Ed.), Interest in 
Islamic Economics: Understanding Ribā (London, New York: Routledge, 2006). 
33  Mohammed Uzair, Interest-Free Banking (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1978). 
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and depositor. This structure is not observed in practice and is contested by the 
Traditionalist jurists (along with some Ḥanafīs), as elaborated below. 
 
 
4  Muḍāraba and the Economic Decline of the Muslim World 
 
Çizakça illustrates how the muḍāraba was adapted by the Italian merchants 
(trading with their Arab counterparts) in the form of partnership termed as 
‘commenda’.34 Further adaption of this facility is said to have climaxed in the 
form of a convertible preferred stock employed by venture capitalists in Silicon 
Valley in California.35 The adaption of the muḍāraba from its classical structure, 
however, was precluded in the Muslim world due to constraints imposed by 
fiqh. The issue for the majority of jurists was that a thing established contrary to 
legal analogy (qiyās) cannot be used as an analogy for other things; since 
muḍāraba superseded basic rules of law and was in defiance of analogy, it could 
only be legalised on the grounds of social and economic necessity. It therefore 
had to suffer a legal limitation.36 In keeping with other financial instruments, 
and other aspects of Islamic law, muḍāraba remained undeveloped. As Schacht 
says: 
 
Islamic law, which until the early ʿAbbāsid period had been adaptable and 
growing, from then onwards became increasingly rigid and set in its final 
mold … . It was not all together immutable, but the changes which did take 
place were concerned more with legal theory and the systemic 
superstructure than with positive law…. Taken as a whole, however, 
Islamic law reflects and fits the social and economic conditions of the early 
ʿAbbāsid period, but has become more and more out of touch with later 
developments of state and society.37 
 
It is this rigidity in Islamic law that led in part to the deterioration of the early 
Islamic financial instruments, institutions and markets, leading to the eventual 
economic decline of the Muslim world.38 
 It is therefore imperative to investigate the structure of Islamic financial 
intermediaries to realize what has gone awry with muḍāraba and how it can be 
revived. Dar and Presley state the following on the applicability of the muḍāraba 
in the real world. 
 
“Almost all theoretical models of Islamic banking are either based on 
muḍārabah or mushārakah or both, but to-date actual practice of Islamic 
banking is far from these modes. Nearly all Islamic banks, investment 
companies, and investment funds offer trade and project finance on mark-
                                                 
34  Murat Çizakça, A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and 
Europe, with Specific References to the Ottoman Archive (New York: Brill 1996). 
35  Ibid.  
36  See Hasanuz-Zaman, supra note 29 at 70; Udovitch, supra note 7.  
37  Supra note 18 at 76–77. 
38  See Timur Kuran, “Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical 
Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (2004): 71–
90. 
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up, commissioned manufacturing, or on leasing bases. PLS (i.e., Profit Loss 
Sharing based on muḍārabah or mushārakah) features marginally in the 
practice of Islamic banking and finance. 
Whatever is the degree of success of individual Islamic banks, they have 
so far failed in adopting PLS-based modes of financing in their business. 
Even specialised Islamic firms like Mudārabah Companies (MCos) in 
Pakistan, which are supposed to be functioning purely on a PLS basis, have 
negligible proportion of their funds invested on a muḍārabah or 
mushārakah basis. According to the International Association of Islamic 
Banks, PLS covered less than 20 percent of investments made by Islamic 
banks world-wide (1996 figures). Likewise, the Islamic Development Bank 
(IDB) has so far not used PLS in its financial business except in a few small 
projects.”39  
 
In general, financial economists highlight the following advantages and 
disadvantages of the muḍāraba facility: 
 
Advantages: 
– It avoids fragility endowed in pure debt (or even traditional “Islamic” 
debt facilities of murābaḥa (cost plus mark-up), tawarruq (tripartite 
sale) and qarḍ ḥasan (benevolent loan).40 This enhances the 
robustness of the financial system and is consistent with the Qurʾānic 
injunction of giving respite to borrowers in times of difficulty.41 
 
Disadvantages: 
– A restrictive requirement set by the dictates of the fiqh literature 
defines the sole responsibility of the rabb al-māl of providing 100% 
capital and solely being subject to losses. This constriction from 
creates an incentive (agency) issue, as the muḍārib has none of 
his/her capital at stake.42 
– Another form of inefficiency endowed by fiqh is in denying any form 
of control rights to the rabb al-māl.43 
– Muḍāraba suffers from the usual consequences of ex-ante and ex-
post asymmetric information (i.e., adverse selection and moral 
hazard, respectively).44 It needs mechanisms to overcome these two 
problems. 
 
It is sometimes suggested that muḍāraba is advantageous insofar as it adheres 
to the Qurʾānic injunction of avoiding expropriation of a counterparty’s assets.45 
The reality is that the rabb al-māl is not safeguarded in a classical muḍāraba 
                                                 
39  Supra note 28 at 3. 
40  See M. Shahid Ebrahim and Mustapha Sheikh, “Debt Instruments in Islamic Finance", 
Working Paper, Durham Business School (2014). 
41  See Q2:280. 
42  Supra note 28. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid. 
45  See Q2:275, Q2:278-279, Q2:281, Q3:130-132, Q4:161 and Q30:39. 
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arrangement to a requisite degree because he is made to bear all the risk, while 
the muḍārib, in contradistinction, bears no risk whatsoever.  
 
 
5  Reviving the Muḍāraba 
 
The disadvantages of the muḍāraba (as stated above) necessitate its revival in 
spirit in the form of a hybrid facility called participating preferred ijāra (PPI).46 
A PPI is structured by merging a special ijāra (leasing) facility with a muḍāraba 
one.47 A preferred ijāra is akin to a preferred stock but backed by leases whose 
payoffs are capped and reduced. Through this special ijāra component, 
investors are bestowed with limited income in return for a share in the risk of 
the project. This feature of sharing in the risk cures the preferred ijāra of the 
fragility endowed in its regular counterpart, making it compliant with the 
Qurʾānic injunction of giving respite to borrowers in times of difficulty.48 In 
contrast, the muḍāraba component bestows a share in operating income along 
with any appreciation at the terminal stage and mitigates fragility of the 
venture. 
 The resulting hybrid facility (i.e., PPI) is basically a true Profit and Loss 
sharing one without the major disadvantages of the muḍāraba, as elaborated 
below. It confers the following benefits: 
 
– It is extremely malleable into family of financial instruments catering 
to the needs of a diverse clientele. That is, it ranges from a pure 
income bond (i.e., muqāraḍa bond) to a pure growth facility (like the 
classic muḍāraba).49 
– The financier: (i) is ranked ahead of the owner of the firm (or 
project); and (ii) subsidises a 'capped' fixed portion (from the ijāra 
component of the facility) in return for a 'proportion' (or a fraction) 
of payoffs in the operating or terminal states of the economy (or 
both). 
– It resolves adverse selection, as it is asset-backed. 
– It alleviates the fragility of the financial system. This enhances the 
robustness of the financial system. 
– It allows an investor to retain control of the firm even in the good 
state of the economy, unlike convertible debt, where the conversion 
to equity dilutes these control rights. 
 
A PPI, however, needs to be priced to avoid expropriation of the assets of a 
counterparty. It also needs a mechanism to overcome moral hazard.50 
 
 
                                                 
46  See M. Shahid Ebrahim, Murizah O. Salleh and Mustapha Sheikh, “Rationalising Hybrid 
Financial Instruments from an Uṣūlī Perspective", Arab Law Quarterly 28 (2014). 
47  Ibid. 
48  See Q2:280 
49  See M. Shahid Ebrahim, “Integrating Islamic and Conventional Project Finance", 
Thunderbird International Business Review 41 (1999): 583–609. 
50  Supra note 46. 
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6. Conclusion  
 
Hasanuz-Zaman has argued that the importance of the muḍāraba facility in 
Islam has been overstated: “Shirkah and Muḍārabah are not sacrosanct nor are 
they end-all of financial or business relationship”.51 While the authors are 
minded to agree with this assessment, the reality on the ground runs counter to 
this; in fact, recent history demonstrates the widespread call from various 
Muslim quarters for a renewed implementation of these facilities, particularly 
the muḍāraba, in their classical form. Yet the failure to adapt facilities such as 
the muḍāraba has highlighted the uneasy relationship between intellectual 
rigidity and economic malaise, with consequences which have for centuries had 
a crippling effect on Muslim economies. This article has highlighted that static 
and flawed ijtihād (interpretation or deduction of the divine sources of law) 
stemming from the rigid rules of taqlīd (blindly imitating religious authority) 
has played a significant role in the perennial underdevelopment of the Muslim 
world. Muslim jurists failed to undertake a dynamic ijtihād52 by adapting 
organisational forms which would have allowed businesses to competitively 
deliver the products demanded by their customers at the lowest cost by 
mitigating transaction costs.53 Thus there is therefore a need to develop these 
organizational forms in conjunction with optimal financial instruments,54 a 
technical design based on the seminal study of Miller,55 which would link 
organizational forms with their underlying capital structure.  
In summary, there is an exigency to overhaul the fiqh literature 
developed in the classical period through the employment of a joint ijtihād 
(juristic interpretation), that galvanises the efforts of various experts, as 
encouraged by al-Alwānī.56 It is hoped that this paper demonstrates how this 
might be achieved vis-à-vis the classical muḍāraba facility, and its restructuring 
along the lines of a participating preferred ijāra.57  
 
                                                 
51  Supra note 29 at 85. 
52  See Abdulmajeed H. Bello, “Dynamic Approach to the Shari‘ah: A Case Study of Ijtihād and 
its Application in Contemporary Society”, Arab Law Quarterly 27 (2013): 259–270. 
53  See Ronald H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm", Economica (4) New Series (16) (1937): 
386–405; and Armen A. Alchian, “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory", Journal of 
Political Economy 58 (1950): 211–221. 
54  This is elaborated in M. Shahid Ebrahim and Ike Mathur, “On the Efficiency of the UPREIT 
Organizational Form: Implications for the Subprime Crisis and CDO'S", Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 85 (2013): 286–305. 
55  Merton H. Miller, “Debt and Taxes’‘, Journal of Finance 32 (1977): 261–275. 
56  Tāha Jābir al-Alwānī, “The Role of Islamic Ijtihād in the Regulation and Correction of Capital 
Markets", American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 14(3) (1997): 39–66. 
57  Supra note 46. 
